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Susan Q. Wombwoman v. State of California
hy Laura Weinstock *
In a seminar I took on judicial process, we were asked to examine a
"hypothetical" fact pattern and write a judicial opinion as if we were
writing for the majority on the California Supreme Court. For the
purpose of the assignment, we assumed that the California Legislature
had amended the state child abuse statute, Penal Code section 273(a), to
include fetuses. A woman who was both pregnant and abusing cocaine
was prosecuted under this amended statute and I, as the court, had to
decide on appeal whether the amended statute was constitutional.
The following opinion reflects my dissatisfaction with current equal
protection and privacy doctrine analysis, especially in the area of
reproduction. Although this particular fact pattern was created for the
classroom, it is far from "hypothetical." Women's reproductive rights
are being increasingly curtailed in the name of fetal rights. Indeed, fetal
rights legislation has resulted in such intrusive control over women's
lives that one can not help but wonder whether this control over women
via their reproductive abilities is the masked intention of the proponents
of these laws. How much better off the world would be if the Supreme
Court produced opinions such as the one that follows.
SUSAN Q. WOMB WOMAN,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Respondent.

Opinion
WEINSTOCK, J.
The facts of the case at issue are uncontested. The State of
California brought suit against appellant for violation of the recently
amended California felony child abuse statute, Penal Code section

* The author graduated from Cornell University in 1982. She lived in Central and South
America for two years and speaks fluent Spanish, Portuguese and French. She came to law
school after working in the battered women and rape crisis movements and experiencing
frustration, anger, and disbelief at the complete lack of justice women victims of sexual
and physical violence receive in the courtroom. She plans to continue to work to end all
oppressions and "isms" and hopes to practice employment discrimination law. She plays
guitar and piano and wants to learn to play the flute and banjo.
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'273(a).1 Appellant, a welfare recipient and cocaine addict, was eight
months pregnant when she was arrested for possession of cocaine.
When tested, traces of cocaine were found in her urine. Two months
prior to the arrest, appellant's physician had warned her that continued
use of the dr'ug would endanger the fetus's life.
The trial court found appellant guilty of California felony child abuse
due to her willful ingestion of cocaine with the full know ledge that it
would harm her fetus. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.
Appellant appeals on behalf of herself and all women, contesting the
validity of the statute as violating women's rights to privacy and equal
protection under the California Constitution. We reverse.

The History of Fetal Rights Legislation
We recognize that the expansion of legal protection afforded fetuses
has been motivated by legitimate concerns. Through no fault of their
own, increasing numbers of babies are being born with mental and
physical defects due to their mothers' use of drugs or alcohol during
pregnancy. Unfortunately, much of the recent legislation involving fetal
protection has not analyzed how best to address these legitimate
concerns. The drafters and proponents of fetal rights have not
considered the long-term consequences of new legislation on women, as
carriers and potential carriers of fetuses. 2
Until recently, courts have been hesitant to grant fetuses legal rights
except in narrowly defined instances where the rights were contingent
upon a live birth. 3 Thus, a fetus in existence when a testator died was
considered a person for inheritance purposes, if it was subsequently
born alive. Similarly, if a fetus was injured before birth, the
subsequently born child was allowed a cause of action for its prenatal
injuries. The fetus, in these circumstances, was not given any rights
independent of its mother. At birth, it acquired rights to compensate the

1. Section 273(a) states, "(I) any person, who under circumstances or conditions likely
to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child [or fetus] to

suffer, or having the care or custody of any child [or fetus], willfully causes or permits the
person or health of such child [or fetus] to be injured, or willfully causes or permits such
child [or fetus] to be placed in such situation that its person or health is endangered, is
punishable by imprisonment .... CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (WEST 1988).
2. Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights
to Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 600 (1986).
3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-163 (1973).
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live child and her or his parents. The fetus "as a fetus" was not
protected by these laws. 4
Since Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the law has increasingly
granted fetal rights in circumstances not involving a live birth. Most
states now consider fetuses to be persons in wrongful OOathclaims-er
vehicular homicides. Such laws compensate the parents for losing their
expected child and protect the mother who chooses to carry to term.
Similarly, feticide laws protect pregnant women from violent attacks by
third parties. All of these laws are favorable to the pregnant woman. s
When laws recognize the fetus rather than the woman as possessing
rights where there is no live birth, the situation changes dramatically.
By granting rights to the fetus "as a fetus" and not simply to compensate
the subsequently born child or its parents, laws create an opportunity for
fetal rights to be used against pregnant women. We are confronted with
this situation in the instant case, in which a child abuse statute has been
amended to include fetuses, to the detriment of the women who carry
them.

The Statute Violates Women's Privacy Rights Under the
California Constitution
This court wrote in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v.
Myers 6 that basic principles of federalism permit and encourage
construction of state statutes under the state constitution. The federal
Bill of Rights was patterned after pre-existing state constitutions and not
the reverse. In fact, state constitutions were once seen as the only
protection for individuals against local officials. 7 By interpreting state
constitutional guarantees, state courts fulfill their obligation to safeguard
the rights of their citizens. In light of this obligation, we turn to the
California Constitution to determine the validity of section 273(a).
Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution was amended by
the people in 1972 to include the right to privacy as one of the
inalienable rights afforded its citizens. Because the federal constitution
does not explicitly mention the privacy right, this court has deemed the
federal right to be narrower than the right granted by our state

4. Cowles v. Cowles, 56 Conn. 240 (1887); Medlock v. Brown, 163 Ga. 520 (1927);
McLain v. Howald, 120 Mich. 274 (1899); Christian v. Carter, 193 N.C. 537, 538
(1927).
5. Note, supra note 2, at 603.
6. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 261 (1981).
7.Id. at 261.
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constitution. S Included in the right to privacy is the fundamental right of
procreative choice that this court recognized in People v. Belous9 four
years prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade.
Because the California rights to privacy and procreative choice are
fundamental rights, legislation that seeks to regulate these rights can
only be upheld if it is narrowly drawn to foster compelling state
interests. The state in the instant case asserts a compelling interest in
protecting fetuses. However, the state, by imposing criminal penalties
on pregnant women who injure their fetuses, has designed legislation
that aims to protect fetuses by controlling the women who carry them.
This violates women's fundamental constitutional right of procreative
choice by severely restricting pregnant women's ability to control their
bodies and daily lives during their pregnancies. Further, the statute
does not seek to do this in the least intrusive manner, but seeks to
incarcerate women, thereby completely impeding their ability to exercise
their own fundamental rights. For this reason, section 273(a) fails to
pass constitutional muster under the California right to privacy.
Granting fetal rights that can be asserted against the mother would
create an unprecedented intrusion on women's bodies and lives. The
United States Supreme Court has long held that the right to privacy
includes the right to be free from bodily intrusion. lO "No right is held
more sacred, [nor] is more carefully guarded ... than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person. "11
Even isolated attempts at intrusions, similar to those that pregnant
women would be subjected to under section 273(a), have been declared
unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court has held that states
may not compel criminal suspects or involuntarily committed mental
patients to undergo certain relatively minor and rapid medical
procedures. 12
Under the statute at issue, pregnant drug users would be forcibly
detained for the length of their pregnancy and possibly longer. Clearly
the privacy interest and expectation intruded upon by detaining a
pregnant women for nine months are greater than those involved in the
8. [d. at 262-263.
9. 71 Cal. 2d 954 (1969).
10. Note, supra note 2, at 615.
11. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
12. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), the Court held that the forcible
pumping of a criminal suspect's stomach violated his fourteenth amendment due process
rights even though the police saw him swallow two pills that they believed were illegal
drugs. In Winston v. Lee, 105 S.Ct. 1611 (1985), the Court held that the surgical removal
of a bullet from a suspect's body against the suspect's will (when said bullet was used as
evidence) was unconstitutional. Note, supra note 2, at 616.
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thirty-minute procedure involved in the removal of bullets from a
person's body. If the more limited federal privacy right protects
individuals from relatively minor and short-term bodily intrusion and
detention, the fundamental privacy right under the California
Constitution clearly protects women from forced detainment during their
pregnancies.
Although the state argues it has a compelling interest in protecting
potential human life, we are not persuaded that this statute is narrowly
drawn to address this interest. There are less burdensome and more
effective alternatives available to the state than imprisoning, policing,
and monitoring pregnant women, such as education about the effects of
drug use and drug rehabilitation programs. Furthermore, the woman
has a fundamental right to be protected from state interference with her
decisions involving childbearing. By restricting a pregnant woman's
conduct in the guise of protecting a fetus, the state is appropriating her
right to control her actions during pregnancy.
Given the fetus's complete physical dependence on the woman's
body, every conceivable act of the pregnant woman can adversely affect
the fetus. Under section 273(a), women could be held criminally liable
for fetal accidents resulting from maternal negligence, improper diet,
exposure to infectious disease or workplace hazards, residence at high
altitudes, airplane trips, immoderate exercise, or sexual intercourse.
They would live in constant fear that any error in judgment might result
in criminal (or civil) prosecution. To protect a fetus from a drugaddicted mother such as the appellant, it would be necessary to detain
the woman, severely threatening her constitutionally protected rights to
autonomy and bodily integrity.13
This impingement of the pregnant woman's autonomy is caused by
ignoring both the purpose behind the historically narrow recognition of
fetal rights and alternatives that would more appropriately protect the
fetus. The original drafters of section 273(a) intended the statute to
protect liveborn children who are susceptible to "care and custody."14
By expanding the statute to cover fetuses in response to the public
outcry against drug abuse, legislators have created an adversarial
relationship between the pregnant woman and her fetus that ultimately
threatens rather than protects the fetus from this abuse.
The threat of criminal prosecution and infringement of women's
liberty will discourage women from becoming pregnant or carrying their
pregnancies to term. To avoid these penalties, pregnant drug abusers,
13. Note, supra note 2, at 608.
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) notes 2, 4.
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desperately in need of medical care, will refrain from seeking prenatal
care altogether, endangering their own health as well as that of the fetus.
In addition, state intrusion upon the mother's autonomy impairs
important emotional bonds between the woman and her fetus. Mothers
who are civilly Of criminally de-tained typically pass their sense of
helplessness on to their fetuses. Often the distress has led to pregnancy
disorders, stillbirth, and premature delivery.ls
Because the woman and her fetus are physiologically and
emotionally connected, the fetus's needs cannot be met if the needs of
the mother are unmet. Pregnant drug users need help, not criminal
sanctions. They need education about the effects of drugs and alcohol
on their fetuses and they need rehabilitation to conquer their addictions.
They also need counseling to explore the origins of their drug use. By
providing these much needed services to pregnant drug users, states will
avoid infringing upon women's constitutional rights and will better
protect their fetuses.
We are greatly dissatisfied with the privacy doctrine even under the
California Constitution as a means of protecting women from
discriminatory legislation. In Myers,16 the court held that once the
legislature had agreed to fund medical services for poor women, it could
not prevent them from exercising their constitutional rights by
withholding these funds for abortions. In so holding, the court noted
that poor women are effectively prevented from exercising their right to
abortion, if they are not provided with funds to pay for them.
However, it also stated that the legislature is not compelled to provide
medical care to the poor in the first place. In other words, the privacy
doctrine is not sufficient, in and of itself, to grant poor women the
means to "effectively" exercise their right to abortion.
Later in the opinion, the Myers court further demonstrated that
women (including poor women) are not adequately protected by the
privacy doctrine. The court noted that it was possible for the state to
assert a compelling interest in protecting nonviable fetuses but that it
could not do so by discriminating against poor women onlyP Since we
are cognizant of class issues and how they operate to circumscribe
women in need of abortions, we now recognize that the analysis in the
Myers decision is defective. The logical consequence of such thinking

15. Note, Less State Intervention and Greater State Assistance Equals Greater Maternal
Rights and Less Prenatal Abuse, 1 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 129, 149 (1989).
16. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 281 (1981).
17.ld.
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is to find that the state's right to favor fetuses over women may be
upheld, so long as all women are discriminated against equally.
Under the privacy doctrine, the state restrains itself from interfering
with activities involving the home, marriage, and heterosexual sexuality.
Its basic tenet is that autooomou:s individnaIs interact "freely and
equally" as long as the government does not interfere. 18 Injuries do not
occur within or because of the private sphere, but result when the state
crosses the line and infringes on the private sphere.
When this gender neutral analysis is replaced with a feminist
critique, the inadequacies of the privacy doctrine in protecting women
become clear. Women have not experienced autonomy in the private
sphere; on the contrary, it is where they have been most oppressed. In
the private sphere, women are exploited and devalued for their labor and
experience marital rape and battery. By barring government interference
in the private sphere, the privacy doctrine prevents women from
changing their powerlessness in this sphere. "The existing distribution
of power and resources within the private sphere will be precisely what
the law of privacy exists to protect."19
Since inequality is pervasive in the private sphere, women require
intervention, not government restraint, to protect their rights. To fail to
recognize this inequality is to give to men the right "to oppress women
one at a time.,,2o Because we do not wish to perpetuate or reinforce this
inequality, we find the privacy doctrine grossly inadequate to protect
women and look to the equal protection clause instead.

The Statute Violates Women's Equal Protection Rights
Under the California Constitution
Although the privacy doctrine recognizes that fetal rights laws
threaten the autonomy of pregnant women, they do not address the sexspecific nature of that threat. Only women suffer from such laws
because only women can bear children. Laws that control pregnant
women restrict women as women. They also penalize women because
of their unique child-bearing ability, a characteristic that has historically
been used to perpetuate sexual inequality.21
The equal protection clause of the California Constitution protects
women from sexual discrimination subject to the strict scrutiny

18. C.

~ACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED

19. Id. at 101.
20. Id. at 102.
21. See generally Note, supra note 2.

99 (1987).
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standard. 22 Under traditional equal protection analysis, women are
granted equal protection only to the extent that they are "similarly
situated" to men. Because women are dissimilarly situated to men in
issues involving pregnancy, the United States Supreme Court has held
that pregnancy related discrimination is based on biological differences
between the sexes and is not sex discrimination at all. 23 According to
the Court, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy does not
discriminate against women but only differentiates between pregnant
and nonpregnant PEOPLE.24
By dismissing sex discrimination claims where women and men are
differently situated because of biological differences the Court evades
the true purpose of equal protection: preventing the state from
systematically using an immutable characteristic of a class of people as a
basis for disadvantaging that class. Biological differences between
women and men have historically been used to disadvantage women. In
dismissing pregnancy discrimination claims from equal protection
scrutiny, the Court rationalizes differential treatment as legitimate,
instead of socially created. 25
State and social regulations regarding reproductive differences have
created and reinforced separate and unequal sex-segregated spheres. 26
Men and male norms dominate the public sphere. Many women are
relegated to the private sphere where they perform socially necessary but
socially unrewarded childcare and housework. Conformity to sex roles
has occurred through the imposing of social, economic, and legal
constraints that often use women's reproductive ability as justification
for their exclusion from the public sphere.
The United States Supreme Court has upheld restrictions on the
number of hours women could work because of a "public interest" in
protecting the fetus. "The burdens necessarily borne by women for the
preservation of the race" were used to justify women's exemption from
22. Sail'er Inn, Inc v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 20 (1971). The United States Supreme Court
subjects sex discrimination claims to the less rigorous, intermediate scrutiny standard.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
23. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
24. Note, supra note 2, at 622. Congress rejected the Supreme Court's conclusion in the
employment setting by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act under Title VI, 42
U.S.c. § 2000e(k) in 1978. The Act states that pregnancy discrimination in employment
is sex-based discrimination.
25. Note, supra note 2, at 622.
26. [d. at 623. The concept of "separate but equal" was held unconstitutional by the
United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). If
"separate but equal" is not tolerable because of the detrimental psychological effect
(among other negative effects) it produces, we find it impermissible for laws contributing
to "separate but UNeqUal" conditions to be upheld.
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poll taxes if they decided not to vote. 27 Women have been exempted
from jury duty due to their "special responsibilities" in the home. 28 The
rationale for restricting women to the private sphere is strikingly similar
to the rationale used by fetal rights legislation that "protects" the fetus
by imprisoning the -woman wOO carries it.
"Despite the [United States Supreme] Court's pronouncements to
the contrary, laws that disadvantage PEOPLE on the basis of pregnancy
disadvantage only WOMEN."29 For this reason, we hold that women
are being denied equal protection of the laws under the California
Constitution by the implementation of Section 273(a) which restricts,
controls and imprisons only women during their pregnancies. Because
traditional equal protection analysis perpetuates inequality between the
sexes by requiring women to be similar to men (while men need not be
similar to anyone in order to be entitled to their privileges) we are
adopting a new equal protection analysis.
Under this new analysis, equal protection doctrine in California will
scrutinize all laws governing reproduction to ensure that "1) the law has
no significant impact in perpetuating either the oppression of women or
culturally imposed sex-role constraints on individual freedom or 2) if the
law has this impact, it is justified as the best means of serving a
compelling state purpose. "30 It is clear that under this new approach,
Section 273(a) fails to pass muster. The law perpetuates the oppression
of women and culturally imposed sex-role constraints. It is clearly not
the best means of achieving the state goals of protecting the fetus. 31 To
the contrary, it leads to decreased protection of the fetus and of the
woman who carries it. 32
We recognize that judicial restraint demands adherence to the
principles of stare decisis and judicial deference to the legislative branch.
We have complied with our duties in this decision. First, we agree with
the legal realists that society is in a state of flux and it typically moves
27. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 282 (1937).
28. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
29. Note, supra note 2, at 624.
30.Id. This analysis was suggested by Professor Sylvia Law, who also writes, "Given
how central state regulation of biology has been to the subjugation of women, the normal
presumption of constitutionality is inappropriate and the state should bear the burden of
justifying its rule in relation to either proposition." Id. We hereby adopt her suggestion
in this opinion.
31. As discussed earlier in this opinion, education, counseling, and drug rehabilitation
programs are all more effective and less intrusive means of protecting the unborn.
32. Because we have overruled section 273(a) on equal protection and privacy grounds
we do not need to discuss the constitutionality of punishing drug addicts for addictions
that they cannot control without help and support. However, we do note that a majority of
this court finds such punishment to be morally reprehensible.
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more quickly than the law. Since laws are supposed to serve society,
judges must frequently re-examine the laws that come before them to
determine how adequately they are achieving this purpose. 33 When a
law is no longer appropriate (or is inappropriate from its inception), it is
our duty to overrule it. Soch is the c-ase with theatmmled version of
273(a).
We agree with the critical legal scholars that neither the laws nor the
judges who interpret them are value neutral. Legislative drafters and
judicial interpreters alike have all of the racist, sexist, c1assist,
homophobic and institutionally-imposed biases so prevalent in the rest
of society. "Traditional jurisprudence largely ignores social and
historical reality, and masks the existence of social conflict and
oppression with ideological myths about objectivity and neutrality. The
dominant system has been declared value free; it then follows that all
others suffer from bias and can be thoughtlessly dismissed."34
It is our duty therefore, to recognize our biases as well as the
fundamental class, sex, and race conflicts in society and seek to
eradicate, rather than perpetuate the oppression based on these
conflicts. 35 Although we are not an elected body of officials like the
legislature, it has always been the solemn duty of the courts to protect
disadvantaged groups which might not be protected sufficiently by
officials concerned about re-election.
This decision does not circumvent the will of either the citizens or
the legislators of California. Since the 1970s both groups have striven
to equalize the laws and the Constitution. In 1972, when privacy was
added by California voters to article I, section 1 of the Constitution, they
also substituted the word "people" for "men. "36 In 1975, the legislature
passed the Family Law Act to bring state laws in line with changes
33. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1222, 1236 (1931).
34. D. KAIRYS, THEPOUfICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 4 (1982).
35. Because of the diversity of this Court it has been easier to examine our own biases
and those which exist in the laws. We consider ourselves fortunate that the Court is
comprised of Asian, Latin, Black, and Native American justices, that four out of seven of
us are women, and that two of our members are openly gay. Former California Supreme
Court Justice Grodin was also aware of the importance of a diverse court. In his book, In
Pursuit of Justice, he writes,
The diversity within our court . . . made me realize that the significance of
including women and minorities on a tribunal is much more than symbolic.
Bird, Broussard and Reynoso brought to our discussions perspectives that went
beyond my own experience; but even apart from anything they said, their very
presence tended to heighten my own sensitivity toward those perspectives, and I
believe the same was true for other judges as well. J. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF
JUSTICE 58 (1989).
36. CAL. CONST. art I, § 1.
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brought about in the family by the women's movement. 37 Finally,
virtually all wording in statutes and in the California Constitution have
discarded the gender-biased "generic," he/him, for the gender inclusive
he/she and him/her. This decision, therefore, merely extends the efforts
toward gender equality already begun by Californians in their desire to
eliminate all forms of oppression.
In sum, we hold that section 273(a) of the California Penal Code as
amended to include fetuses is unconstitutional under the California
Constitution. It violates appellant's, as well as all women's rights to
equal protection and privacy. We have now officially recognized the
inadequacy of traditional privacy and equal protection analyses as
applied to women's reproductive freedoms. Consequently, we have
adopted a new equal protection approach designed to eradicate, rather
than perpetuate, the oppression of women. Reversed and remanded for
a new trial consistent with this opinion.

37. West's Street Law 517 3d ed., (1987).

